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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No.980056-CA 
v. : 
TRACEY EUGENE SMITH, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the lower court's denial of defendant's motion to 
withdraw his 1988 guilty plea to one count of criminal homicide, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-201, 76-5-202(1 )(d) (Supp. 1985), in the Fifth 
Judicial District Court, Beaver County, Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(1996) (permitting the Supreme Court to transfer jurisdiction). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the lower court properly refuse to re-examine defendant's previously 
litigated claims? 
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2. Did the lower court correctly dismiss defendant's motion to withdraw as 
frivolous? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
It is well established that withdrawal of a guilty plea is a privilege, not a 
right, which is "within the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Gallegos. 738 P.2d 
1040, 1041 (Utah 1987). The denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will only be 
disturbed on appeal if it appears the court has abused its discretion. State v. Holland, 921 
P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996); State v. Thorup. 841 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah App. 1990). To 
find an abuse of discretion, the appellate court must determine that the lower court acted 
beyond the bounds of reasonability. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). 
An appellate court will not overturn a trial court's determination that the defendant has not 
shown good cause "unless it clearly appears that the trial court abused its discretion." 
State v. Trujillo-Martinez. 814 P.2d 596, 599 (Utah App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of any relevant constitutional provisions, statutes or rules is 
contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1988, defendant was charged with murder in the first degree, a capital 
offense (R. 2). Defendant conditionally pled guilty, reserving the right to withdraw the 
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plea if sentenced to death (R. 23-27). The trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison, 
with a twenty-year incarceration recommendation (R. 30-31). 
For the past ten years, the defendant has filed numerous motions attempting 
to withdraw his plea, claiming that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel, that 
his sentence was illegal, and that the court erred during sentencing. These motions have 
all been denied. 
On July 28, 1997, defendant filed a self-styled "Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea and Correct Illegal Sentence" (R. 219), which the lower court denied (R. 266-70; 
Addendum A). Defendant then filed a "Motion of reconcideration [sic] of defendants [sic] 
motion to withdraw guilty plea, and correct illegal sentence" (R. 271-74), which was also 
denied (R. 282-87). Defendant timely filed this appeal (R. 288). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 3, 1988, defendant murdered James Glen Bray in a rest stop 
restroom during an attempted robbery (R. 2). Defendant was charged with murder in the 
first degree, a capital offense, in violation of §§ 76-5-201 and 76-5-202 (l)(d) (Supp. 
1985), in that defendant committed homicide with a firearm while engaged in the 
commission of, or attempt to commit, an aggravated robbery or robbery (R. 2-3). 
On November 14, 1988, defendant pleaded guilty to first degree murder in 
exchange for a sentence of life imprisonment and an agreement by the State not to 
recommend the death penalty (R. 26). Defendant was represented by court-appointed 
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counsel James L. Shumate. Defendant expressly waived his right to a jury trial and 
submitted himself to the court for sentencing, specifically acknowledging that the trial 
court maintained complete discretion over the sentence, regardless of any recommendation 
by the parties. (R. 24; 27) Defendant reserved the right to withdraw his plea only if he 
were sentenced to death (R.23-29). The trial court informed defendant: of the 
constitutional rights he was waiving; of the consequences of pleading guilty; of the 
applicable law; and of the right to appeal and the pertinent deadlines for an appeal (R. 46-
55). The trial court also ensured that defendant was fully aware of the ramifications of 
pleading guilty (id.). On November 22, 1988, the trial court sentenced defendant to life 
in prison and recommended that "the Defendant not be allowed parole or even be 
considered for parole until he has served at least Twenty (20) years" (R. 30-31). 
On December 22, 1988, defendant filed, pro se, a "notice of belated appeal" 
from the judgment, partially claiming ineffective assistance of counsel (R. 33-38). 
Defendant later voluntarily withdrew this motion (R. 86). 
Defendant's First Motion to Withdraw 
Three years later, on December 4, 1991, defendant, pro se, filed a motion 
to withdraw guilty plea [hereinafter "motion to withdraw"] (R. 100-01). On February 20, 
1992, the trial court denied the motion (R. 150-54). Defendant filed an appeal to the State 
Supreme Court (R. 185-86). On appeal, defendant raised several issues that his court-
appointed counsel, Craig S. Cook, considered to be without merit. However, appellate 
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counsel found several grounds for appeal, including issues based on sentencing, that had 
not been presented to the lower court. I(L In denying the motion to withdraw, the Supreme 
Court declined to rule on the sentencing issues as they were raised for the first time on 
appeal (R. 185-86; State v. Smith. 866 P.2d 532 (Utah 1993)). The Court, however, 
found that sentencing issues could be addressed in the pending post-conviction petition 
(discussed below). Smith. 866 P.2d at 533. 
State Post-Conviction Petition 
On December 4, 1992, defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
[hereinafter "petition for post-conviction relief] in the Utah Supreme Court alleging that 
he had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel (R. 185). The Supreme Court 
referred the petition to the Third District Court (Smith v. Galetka. No. 930900217). 
On November 22, 1993, after an evidentiary hearing, the Third District 
Court denied defendant's request for post-conviction relief (R. 217; see also Addendum 
B). The post-conviction court made the following findings of fact that are germane to 
defendant's present motion: 
12. Prior to being sentenced, petitioner knew that he faced 
a maximum of life imprisonment. 
13. By entering a guilty plea, petitioner avoided the death 
penalty, which was his primary objective in pleading 
guilty. 
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14. A condition of the plea bargain was that petitioner 
would have been able to withdraw his plea if the trial 
court had imposed the death penalty. 
15. [Trial counsel] correctly advised petitioner that the 
Court would almost certainly impose a sentence up to 
and including life imprisonment. 
16. [Trial counsel] opined to petitioner that he might spend 
five to seven years in prison. 
17. [Trial counsel] correctly advised petitioner that the 
length of time he would actually serve in prison was 
under the exclusive control of the Board of Pardons, 
which would be greatly influenced petition's conduct 
while in prison. 
18. The trial judge's 20-year recommendation is not a 
major factor relied on by the Board of Pardons in 
setting parole rehearing dates. Such recommendations 
are accorded greater or lesser weight depending upon 
their factual support. The judge's recommendation here 
was based solely on the facts of the crime itself. 
19. Defendants who have pled guilty to the capital offense 
of first degree murder ordinarily receive 20 to 25 year 
rehearing date from the Board of Pardons. 
20. On November 12, 1991, petitioner went before the 
Utah Board of Pardons for an original parole grant 
hearing. Petitioner was given a rehearing date of 
October, 2008. 
21. The Board of Pardons stated in writing its reasons for 
setting a 20-year rehearing date. The reasons included 
petitioner's prison misconduct, but did not include the 
judge's recommendation. 
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22. Petitioner has the right to petition the Board of Pardons 
for an earlier rehearing date. 
23. The State's case against petitioner was strong, based 
upon eyewitness testimony and the testimony of 
petitioner's companion, Timothy Miller. 
24. [Trial counsel] testified that petitioner confessed to him 
that his purpose in approaching the victim was to obtain 
money, by violent means if necessary, and that he shot 
the victim without provocation. 
25. Had petitioner known that the judge was going to 
recommend 20 years incarceration, petitioner might still 
have pled guilty. 
26. Petitioner never testified that but for his counsel's 
alleged deficiencies, petitioner would not have pled 
guilty but would have insisted upon going to trial. 
(See Addendum B). 
The post-conviction court's conclusions of law further resolve the issues that 
defendant presented before the lower court in his current motion to withdraw: 
3. [Trial counsel's] representation was more than 
adequate; it did not fall below an objective standard or 
reasonableness. 
4. Even if [trial counsel] committed error, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate prejudice. 
5. Petitioner was well aware when he pled guilty that he 
faced a life sentence. 
• • • 
7. Petitioner has failed to show that he would have 
received a lesser sentence if [trial counsel] had 
requested a presentence investigation report, called 
7 
mitigating witnesses, or made a statement on 
petitioner's behalf at sentencing. 
8. The Board of Pardons is not bound by the trial court's 
20-year recommendation. There is no support for 
petitioner's claim that, had [trial counsel] objected to 
the 20-year recommendation, petitioner would have 
received a lesser sentence and/or an earlier rehearing 
date. 
LL 
Defendant did not appeal the post-conviction court's decision. 
Motion to Correct Sentence 
On May 15, 1996, defendant filed a pro se motion alleging that his sentence 
was illegal and requesting an order to modify the sentence (R. 203-05) The trial court 
denied defendant's motion, and the Court of Appeals upheld this ruling in a memorandum 
decision filed April 3, 1997 (R. 217-18; Addendum C). The Court of Appeals held that 
the determinative issues presented by defendant were resolved in the unappealed post-
conviction ruling (R. 217). 
Second Motion to Withdraw 
On July 28, 1997, defendant again filed in the trial court a "motion to 
withdraw guilty plea and correct illegal sentence." In this motion, defendant alleged that 
he was unconstitutionally confined because the trial court "erred by not personally advising 
the defendant on record that any sentencing agreement or recommendation the defendant 
had with prosecution [was] not binding on the court" (R. 224). Additionally, defendant 
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implicitly argued that his trial counsel was ineffective in not fully apprizing him of the 
ramifications of the sentencing recommendation (R. 225). To support this untimely 
contention, defendant argued that advice from prison contract attorneys and "jail house 
lawyers" constituted new evidence sufficient to establish 'good cause' to bring the belated 
motion (R. 227). On August 25, 1997, the lower court denied defendant's motion on 
several grounds, including a lack of new evidence, a lack of a merit, a running of the 
statute of limitation, and prior determinations of similar issues (R. 266-70; Addendum A). 
On September 5, 1997, defendant filed a "Motion of reconcideration [sic] of 
defendants [sic] motion to withdraw guilty plea, and correct illegal sentence" (R. 271-74). 
In the interests of judicial economy, defendant asked the lower court to reconsider the 
previous motion on the basis that the court erred in overlooking the ineffectiveness of trial 
and appellate counsel. kL Defendant also averred that the trial court had failed to 
properly apply the law. IcL This motion was subsequently dismissed by the trial court (R. 
282-87). Defendant now appeals that ruling. 
On appeal, defendant alleges that the lower court erred in dismissing the 
successive motion to withdraw for noncompliance with the statute of limitations. 
Defendant also claims that appellate counsel's ineffectiveness provides adequate unusual 
circumstances to excuse procedural bar and present his claims. Finally, defendant argues 
that trial counsel was ineffective during the plea and sentencing. Each of these 
contentions fails. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant has addressed his current issues in prior adjudications and, 
therefore, defendant is procedurally barred from advancing these claims, absent unusual 
circumstances. Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1037 (Utah 1989). Defendant failed to 
show sufficient unusual circumstances to merit a readjudication of these issues. 
Additionally, res judicata bars further redetermination of these issues. Accordingly, the 
lower court correctly denied defendant's motion. 
The lower court also correctly dismissed defendant's motion to withdraw as 
frivolous, repetitive, and without merit. The record establishes the validity of defendant's 
guilty plea, the judicial assurance that the defendant understood the consequences of the 
plea, and the ultimate immateriality of the trial court's sentencing recommendation. Also, 
appellate counsel effectively represented defendant on appeal from the denial of 
defendant's first motion to withdraw. This appeal, therefore, is nothing more than 
defendant's impermissible attempt to "frustrate the ends of justice by trying to keep cases 
alive indefinitely." Wright v. Carver. 886 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1994). 
Finally, the post-conviction court, after holding an evidentiary hearing, held 
that trial counsel was not ineffective. Defendant has failed to establish good cause 
warranting relitigation of this issue or to otherwise excuse his failure to appeal. 
Nevertheless, the record establishes the competent service provided by trial counsel. 
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Defendant's allegations fail to meet the legal standard established in Strickland v. 
Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT APPROPRIATELY 
DECLINED TO RELITIGATE 
DEFENDANT'S REPETITIVE CLAIMS 
A. Res Judicata 
Since defendant's current issues have been previously resolved against him, 
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar relitigation. See Salt Lake Citizens 
Congress v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 846 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Utah 1992) (the 
doctrine of res judicata prevents the relitigation of issues that have already been judicially 
determined); Stevensenv. Goodson. 924 P.2d 339, 353 (Utah 1996) (collateral estoppel 
"prevents parties from relitigating issues resolved in a prior related action); Burleigh v. 
Turner. 388 P.2d 412 (Utah 1964) (res judicata applies in habeas corpus actions). 
Defendant's current claims are identical to the issues decided by the post-conviction court. 
The issues in the previous action were decided in a final judgment on the merits and were 
completely, fully, and fairly litigated. See Sew v. Security Title Co.. 902 P.2d 629, 632 
(Utah 1995). Consequently, this Court should affirm the lower court's dismissal of 
defendant's motion to withdraw. 
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B. Successiveness 
Utah law has firmly established that "a prior adjudication of the same ground 
for relief is sufficient to bar relitigation on that ground, absent unusual circumstances." 
Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1037. See also Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (barring issues that 
were "raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could have 
been, but [were] not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief").1 "This rule 
was fashioned to prevent abuse by prisoners who burden the courts and frustrate the ends 
of justice by trying to keep cases alive indefinitely." Wright, 886 P.2d at 60. 
Additionally, any new claims submitted by defendant should only be entertained after a 
good cause showing of why they were not addressed in a previous proceeding. See 
Andrews v. Shulsen. 773 P.2d 832, 833-34 (Utah 1989), cert denied, 505 U.S. 1233 
(1992); Dunn v. Cook. 791 P.2d 873, 878-79 (Utah 1990). 
As noted by the lower court, "[defendant has had repeated opportunities to 
raise this issue, including a prior motion to withdraw his plea" (R. 269; Addendum A). 
Among these repeated opportunities, the defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief 
on December 4, 1992, challenging the integrity of the twenty-year sentencing 
Although the Utah Supreme court has recognized that a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea and a petition for post-conviction relief are "separate and distinct 
procedures," Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1037 n.8 (Utah 1989), the court has nonetheless 
concluded that a motion to withdraw is a species of post-conviction remedy, and 
consequently is subject to the same successiveness limitation prescribed in rule 65B, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (currently rule 65C and Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et 
seq.(1996)). See State v. West, 765 P.2d 891, 893-95 (Utah 1988). 
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recommendation, the knowledge of defendant in entering his plea, and the effectiveness 
of counsel. (See Addendum B). 
The State requests that this Court take judicial notice of the adjudicated facts 
of the post-conviction ruling pursuant to rule 201, Utah Rules of Evidence.2 Courts may 
take judicial notice of the records and prior proceedings in the same case. See Riche v. 
Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah App. 1989) (noting that courts must take judicial notice 
of prior proceedings when requested and supplied with the necessary information). 
Because defendant has previously litigated his current claims, they should be 
"summarily denied if good cause or unusual circumstances cannot be shown." Miller v 
State. 932 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah App. 1997). Defendant alleges several "usual 
circumstances" to establish "good cause" warranting relitigation of his claims. Defendant 
avers: that new evidence in the form of legal advice existed; that his court-appointed 
appellate counsel failed to properly perfect defendant's direct appeal; and that counsel 
failed to perfect an appeal from the dismissal of his post-conviction petition (Brief of App. 
at 22-24). 
2Utah courts are often reluctant to take judicial notice for the first time on appeal 
absent some countervailing principle. See State v. Redd. 954 P.2d 230, 236 n. 7 (Utah 
App. 1998). However, the lower court obviously relied on these prior adjudications in 
dismissing defendant's motion (R. 269, 285-6). Also, appellate courts may "take notice 
for the first time on appeal if doing so would permit affirmance." Mel Trimble Real 
Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch. Inc.. 758 P.2d 451, n.4 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 769 
P.2d 819 (Utah 1988). 
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In his motion to withdraw, defendant claimed that legal advice he received 
from prison counsel and "jail house lawyers" constituted significant unusual circumstances 
to warrant the readjudication of these issues (R. 227). Legal advice and novel legal 
theories, however, are not new evidence. See United States v. Granza. 427 F.2d 184, 186 
(5th Cir. 1970) (holding that recently concocted legal theories do "not qualify as 'newly 
discovered evidence'"); United States v. Hamling. 525 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir.) (finding 
that "evidence will not be deemed 'newly discovered' simply because it appears in a 
different light under a new theory"), cert, denied. 423 U.S. 981 (1975). New evidence 
is "not evidence which was available to defendant but not obtained by him prior to the time 
of trial." State v. Williams. 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985). Defendant must show that 
the evidence is in reality new, that it could not have been discovered at the time the claim 
was addressed. See Utah R.Civ.Pro. 65C(6). In this case, defendant's new legal theories 
were surely available at sentencing. Defendant failed to present ample legal support for 
this 'new evidence,' and consequently the lower court properly dismissed defendant's 
claims. 
Defendant's second contention may also be summarily dismissed. Appellate 
counsel was appointed to represent defendant on his appeal from the denial of his 
December 4, 1991 motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See Smith. 866 P.2d at 532. On 
appeal, counsel was limited by the issues that had been properly presented by defendant 
in his pro se motion in the trial court. KL (finding that "[i]t is black-letter law that an 
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appellate court will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal except in 
extraordinary circumstances that do not exist here"). However, the Utah Supreme Court 
found that "[t]he grounds raised by the defendant [in the trial court were] clearly frivolous 
and cannot be supported." Id, at 533. Moreover, the Court found that the only 
meritorious claims were those raised by counsel for the first time on appeal, and 
subsequently in the post-conviction proceeding. IcL Counsel cannot be considered 
ineffective for not raising meritless or procedurally barred issues on appeal. See Jolivet 
v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Utah 1989) (finding that counsel "could not have been 
deficient in not raising such a meritless claim on appeal"), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1033 
(1990). Any error in not preserving meritless issues for appeal is surely not attributable 
to defendant's appellate counsel. 
In his motion for reconsideration and on appeal, defendant alleges that the 
decision not to appeal the post-conviction ruling is attributable to appellate counsel and is 
good cause to allow the presentation of those issues in this action. The claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is based on the United States Constitution Sixth Amendment's right 
to counsel. See State v. Tvler, 850 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1993); State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232 
(Utah App. 1995). In Utah, there is "no affirmative duty to appoint counsel or to ensure 
that [the defendant is] represented" in post-conviction relief. Brunerv. Carver, 920 P.2d 
1153, 1158 (Utah 1996). Consequently, no ineffective assistance of counsel cause of 
action should arise in a post-conviction proceeding. The United States Supreme Court has 
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likewise recognized that "[b]ecause there is no constitutional right to an attorney in state 
post-conviction proceedings, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance 
of counsel in such proceedings." Coleman v. Thompson. 501 U.S. 722, 725, 111 S. Ct. 
2546, 2551 (1991) (citations omitted). 
This assertion is further buttressed by the fact that "[proceedings in habeas 
corpus are generally regarded as being civil in nature." Maxwell v. Turner. 435 P.2d 287, 
288 (Utah 1967). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not permissible in civil 
cases. See Davis v. Grand County Service Area. 905 P.2d 888, 894 (Utah App. 1995) 
(finding that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are based on the Sixth Amendment 
and have "no parallel in the civil context"). Concomitantly, the statutory language 
providing for post-conviction review prescribes: "An allegation that counsel appointed 
under this section was ineffective cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent post-
conviction petition." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-109(3). 
Furthermore, defendant has not proven that the performance of his court-
appointed pro bono attorney "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" that 
would support the contention that appellate counsel was ineffective. State v. Taylor. 947 
P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997) (quoting Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 2061 (1984)). After the dismissal of the post-conviction petition, appellate 
counsel articulated several reasons for not pursuing an appeal, ultimately determining that 
the chance of success was "very slim" (Brief of App. at Attachment II). Appellate 
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counsel also outlined other possible courses of action. kL Clearly, this represented a 
strategic determination by counsel, and consequently should be honored by the Court. See 
State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996) (giving "trial counsel wide latitude in 
making tactical decisions" and not questioning those decisions "unless there is no 
reasonable basis supporting them"); Hurst. 777 P.2d at 1037 (stating that "claims that are 
withheld for tactical reasons should be summarily dismissed"). Moreover, defendant has 
failed to show harm or prejudice due to the alleged errors. See Bundy v. Deland. 763 
P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988). In sum, defendant has failed "'to show that the ends of justice 
would be served by permitting the redetermination of the ground.'" Hurst. 777 P.2d at 
1037 (quoting Sanders v. United States. 373 U.S. 1, 16 (1963)). Essentially, defendant's 
motion "merely recited those arguments made by Defendant on other occasions, and 
represents an attempt to keep his case alive indefinitely." (R. 286). Accordingly, the 
lower court properly dismissed the motion because defendant's claims were repetitive and 
not predicated on good cause.3 
3The lower court in part concluded that defendant's motion to withdraw was time 
barred due to the statute of limitations contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107 
(1996). The State concedes that section 78-35a-107 applies only to petitions for post-
conviction relief filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 et. seq. (1996). 
However, it is well-settled that courts may affirm the rulings of a lower court on any 
appropriate ground, although the lower court may have relied on another ground. See 
State v. Heaton. 342 Utah Adv. Rep. 19,22 (Utah 1998); DeBrv v. Noble. 889 P.2d 
428, 444 (Utah 1995); State v. Brvan. 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985). 
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POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY 
DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW AS FRIVOLOUS AND 
WITHOUT MERIT 
In denying defendant's motion to withdraw, the lower court ruled that the 
motion was frivolous and unsupported by the record. Essentially, the lower court found 
that the trial court's actions did not render defense counsel ineffective at trial, and that such 
a contention was frivolous on its face. This court reviews the lower court's determination 
for correctness. Wright. 886 P.2d at 60. 
A. Validity of Defendant's Guilty Plea 
In Utah, "a plea's presumption of validity is strong." State v. Thurston, 781 
P.2d 1296, 1301 (Utah App. 1989) (finding no abuse of discretion in trial court's refusal 
to dismiss a guilty plea although the defendant expected a lighter sentence than he 
received). In this case, the record establishes that the defendant was fully apprized of the 
consequences of his plea and that the judge fulfilled his duty in ensuring defendant's 
knowledge and understanding of the plea. 
Defendant signed the "Statement of Defendant Regarding Plea Bargain 
Certificates of Counsel and Order" [hereinafter "plea affidavit"] (R. 23). This affidavit, 
with each statement initialed by the defendant, expressly acknowledged that he was 
aware that any charge or sentencing concessions 
or recommendations for probation or suspended 
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sentences, included a reduction of the charges 
for sentencing made or sought by either defense 
counsel or the prosecutor are not binding on the 
Court and may or may not be approved or 
followed by the Court. 
(R. 27) (Emphasis in original). Defendant, recognizing the potential for a sentence that 
differed from the plea agreement, entered a conditional plea, allowing him to rescind the 
guilty plea if the court imposed a sentence of death. Defendant also affirmed that he had 
reviewed, initialed, and signed the plea affidavit (R. 51-52). Defendant has proffered no 
evidence to establish that he did not understand the plea affidavit or that the court did not 
adequately assure itself of defendant's voluntary consent. 
The trial court correctly followed the mandates of rule 11(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, in allowing defendant to plead guilty. The court assured that 
defendant was represented by an attorney (R. 47) and that the defendant acted freely and 
voluntarily, with a full understanding of the plea agreement (R. 53). Additionally, the trial 
court instructed defendant of the constitutional rights he was waiving (R. 49); assured that 
defendant understood the elements of the crime he was pleading to and the prosecution's 
burden of proving those elements (R. 47-49); and discussed the plea agreement with 
defendant (R. 52). 
Defendant, however, maintains that the trial court erred by failing to advise 
him as to the potential consequences of the plea. This assertion is directly refuted by the 
record and was properly dismissed by the post-conviction court. Rule 11(e)(5) requires 
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the court to find that "the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed 
for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(5). At sentencing, the trial court explicitly 
informed defendant that homicide is punishable by life imprisonment or death (R. 50). 
The court warned defendant of this possibility several times, and even provided defendant 
with a 'sneak preview' of the future sentence — informing defendant that he "most likely 
~ most definitely will sentence [defendant] to serve the rest of [his] life in the Utah State 
Prison" (R. 50, 52). The record clearly demonstrates that the trial court adequately 
assured that defendant understood the consequences of his plea. The trial court informed 
defendant of the only two statutorily prescribed sentences: death and life imprisonment. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206. Although the court did recommend a twenty-year term 
before parole, the Board of Pardons, not the judge, retains the ultimate control in the 
length of the sentence. See Labrum v. State Board of Pardons. 870 P.2d 902, 907 (Utah 
1993) (finding that the trial judge does not fix the term of imprisonment, he only prescribes 
the statutory-based term of years.) See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5 (1996). 
Furthermore, the post-conviction court determined that the trial judge's 
sentencing recommendation was immaterial (Addendum B, if 18 at 4). Regardless of 
whether the sentencing judge followed the expectations of defendant, "it is the Board of 
Pardons, not the district court," that has the authority to determine the actual time served. 
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Rawlingsv. Holden. 869 P.2d 958, 961 (Utah App. 1994); See also Footev. Utah Board 
of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991). 
The record directly refutes defendant's allegation that the trial court failed 
to protect defendant's constitutional rights when it accepted defendant's guilty plea. 
Therefore, this Court should affirm the lower court's denial of defendant's motion to 
withdraw. 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Defendant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective during the plea and 
sentencing proceedings. Again, defendant's allegations should be precluded because they 
were raised, adjudicated, and dismissed in previous proceedings. In his post-conviction 
proceedings, defendant fully litigated his claims of ineffective counsel. The post-
conviction court found that trial counsel correctly advised defendant of the consequences 
of the plea and informed defendant that the Board of Pardons would ultimately decide the 
length of time defendant would serve. (R. 218; Addendum B, % 17 at 3). The post-
conviction court also determined that trial counsel's representation was more than 
adequate, and that defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel's performance. 
(Addendum B, 1 3 at 6). Defendant has not provided adequate unusual circumstances 
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"sufficient to bar relitigation on that ground." Hurst. 777 P.2d at 1037.4 Nevertheless the 
lower court properly rejected defendant's claims on the merits. 
In order to succeed on his claims of ineffective counsel, defendant must 
demonstrate that: (1) specific acts or omission fall outside the wide range of professional 
competent assistance; and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of 
the proceeding. Taylor v. Warden. 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995) (citing Strickland. 466 
U.S. at 687). Defendant must show that trial counsel's representation "fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness," yet even so, the court will not second guess the 
counsel's strategic choices, even if they appear flawed. Strickland. 466 U.S. at 688-89. 
There is a strong presumption that counsel's performance "fell within the wide range of 
professional assistance." IcL See also State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993); 
State v. Wood. 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah), cert, denied. 459 U.S. 988 (1982). 
The post-conviction court found that trial counsel provided effective service. 
(Addendum B, K 3 at 6). The lower court in the present motion appropriately concurred 
(R. 284-85). The record demonstrates that trial counsel reasonably represented defendant 
and informed defendant of the consequences of pleading guilty. Defendant has failed to 
offer any new evidence (other than legal advice from jailhouse lawyers) sufficient to doubt 
the validity of these prior adjudication. For the first time on appeal, defendant raises 
4Defendant has also failed to allege or demonstrate why his ineffectiveness claims 
are not barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
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several unsupported allegations of ineffective trial counsel.5 Among these, defendant 
generally argues that trial counsel did not have a certain level of legal experience (Brief 
of App. at 45).6 Although rule 8, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, now sets minimum 
standards for counsel in capital appellate cases, at the time of defendant's trial, the only 
applicable standard governing competence of counsel in such contexts was Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-32-1(2) (1987) (requiring a county to "[a]fford timely representation by competent 
legal counsel"). See also Taylor, 905 P.2d at 282 (holding that rule 8 does not apply to 
cases adjudicated prior to its enactment). Consequently, trial counsel's effectiveness can 
only be evaluated through the record, which indicates a commendable effort. Moreover, 
defendant has not raised sufficient evidence to counter the post-conviction court's 
determination that defendant's purpose in pleading was to avoid the death penalty, and that 
defendant would have pleaded guilty whether he was aware of the sentence 
recommendation or not. (Addendum B, 1 13 at 3; 1 25-26 at 5). 
5Issues that have not been raised in the lower court cannot be raised on appeal 
for the first time. See Stewart v. Utah Public Service Com'n. 885 P.2d 759, 781 (Utah 
1994); State v. Aase. 762 P.2d 1113, 1117 (Utah App. 1988). Moreover, courts 
"cannot speculate on the existence of facts that do not appear in the record. When 
crucial matters are not in the record, the missing portions are presumed to support the 
action of the trial court." State v. Theison. 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985). 
6To support this allegation, defendant refers to the retroactive application of the 
'rule' created in State v. Holland. 876 P.2d 357 (Utah 1994) which "requires any 
attorney appointed in a capital case to have a minimum level of experience." (Brief of 
App. at 45). The State is unable to find any such retroactive requirement in the cited 
legal precedent. 
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Defendant's claims, therefore, fail both prongs of the Strickland test: he has 
shown neither deficient performance nor prejudice. Accordingly, the lower court properly 
rejected defendant's claims as meritless. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing demonstrates that the lower court properly rejected defendant's 
motion to withdraw as successive and without merit. Accordingly, the State respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the lower court's ruling. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this {j^ day of July, 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
ANGELA F. MICKLOS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid this . .day of July, 1998 to: 
Tracey Eugene Smith 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDIC 
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF 
AUG 25 1997 
[STRICT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRACY EUGENE SMITH, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
CASE NO. 631 
This matter came before the Court this date on the petitioner's Motion and Order for 
Appointment of Legal Counsel. The petitioner moves the Court for appointment of legal 
counsel to be paid by Beaver County and to pursue petitioner's most recent motion to 
withdraw his plea. 
The defendant was convicted of murder upon his plea of guilty on November 14, 1988. 
Thereafter in December 1991, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea after 
having lost his direct appeal rights by inaction. The Court denied the request to withdraw the 
guilty plea and the matter was pursued by appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
On December 27, 1993, the Supreme Court issued its opinion addressing the claims raised by 
the defendant, including the letter written by this Court to the Board of Pardons recommending 
that the defendant serve at least 20 years. The trial court's denial of the Motion to Withdraw 
the plea was upheld. Thereafter the defendant herein filed a motion for an order of the Court 
correcting the sentence which Mr. Smith claimed was illegal. The Court issued a 
Memorandum Opinion on July 19, 1996, in which the defendant's motion was denied. That 
-2-
determination was appealed. On April 3, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum 
Opinion upholding the decision of the trial court. 
In addition Mr. Smith filed in the 3rd-District Court the case of Smith v. Galetka. Case 
No. 930900217, which was a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. In that case Mr. Smith 
raised additional claims as to the propriety of the taking of his plea. The trial court ruled 
against Mr. Smith in that case, and Mr. Smith did not appeal. 
MOTION TO APPOINT LEGAL COUNSEL 
On July 28, 1997, Mr. Smith filed yet another Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and 
Correct Illegal Sentence. He now seeks to have this Court appoint counsel to represent him 
and proposes to require the County of Beaver to pay the costs of that Motion and the 
subsequent proceedings. 
Under the provisions of 78-35a-101 UCA, et. Seq.. the Court has authority only to 
appoint pro bono counsel. There is no provision for appointments paid by the county where 
the conviction occurred. 
This Court apparently has discretion as to whether or not to appoint counsel. (See 78-
35a-109 UCA) Although this is a serious case for the petitioner in view of the long period of 
confinement which he is undergoing, the Court is of the opinion that Mr. Smith has had 
several opportunities to raise the issues which he thought were appropriate relating to his entry 
of his plea of guilty in this case. The Court can see no reason to appoint counsel in this case 
and hereby declines to do so. 
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Section 78-35a-109 UCA requires the court to consider two factors in deciding whether 
to appoint pro bono counsel. The court has considered those factors. This case raises only 
one issue, ie: whether the defendant can withdraw his plea of guilty. Defendant alleges that 
this court failed to comply with the provisions of Rule 11, U.R.Crim.P. There is no need for 
an evidentiary hearing as the issues can be decided from the transcripts and records of the 
taking of the plea. In addition, in view of the provisions of 78-35a-106 UCA and 78-35a-107 
UCA, this court will be dismissing and denying the Motion because the Statute of Limitations 
period has passed and the claim raised by the defendant in this motion was raised and 
addressed in previous appeal proceedings, or should have been, or was raised and addressed in 
previous post conviction relief proceedings, or should have been. 
The issues do not appear complicated and there is no need for an evidentiary hearing. 
Thus the appointment of pro bono counsel is not warranted. 
The petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Legal Counsel is denied. 
MOTIQN TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA AND CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE 
On August 4, 1997, Mr. Smith filed a Notice to Submit for Decision and Request for 
Hearing on his most recent motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The Court declines to set the 
matter for oral argument. The Court has read the Motion submitted by Mr. Smith and the 
affidavits included herewith. Mr. Smith challenges the entry of the plea in this case on the 
grounds that he was not advised that the recommendations of the prosecution and his own 
attorney were not binding upon the Court. 
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Defendant has had repeated opportunities to raise this issue, including a prior motion to 
withdraw his plea. There is no new evidence alleged by defendant. The limitations period for 
post-conviction relief has passed. (See 78-35a-107 UCA) 
Pursuant to Rule 65B(5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this court now finds that this 
motion is frivolous, repetitive and without merit. In addition, it is unsupported by the records 
of the plea. 
Accordingly for the reasons set out above, the Motion is denied. 
DATED this 21st day of August 1997. 
J. PHILIP EVES, District Court Judge 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of August 1997,1 mailed true and correct copies 
of the above and foregoing document, first-class postage prepaid, to the following: 
Leo G. Kanell, Esq. 
Beaver County Attorney 
P.O. Box 471 
Beaver, UT 84713 
Tracy E. Smith 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
Jan Graham, Esq. 
Utah Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140856 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856 
Maxine Munson, Deputy Clerk 
Addendum B 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
ANGELA F. MICKLOS (6229) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY EUGENE SMITH, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
Petitioner, : OF LAW AND ORDER 
v. : 
HANK GALETKA, UTAH STATE : Case No. 930900217 HC 
PRISON, AND STATE OF UTAH 
Respondents. : Judge David S. Young 
Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus came before 
the Court for an evidentiary hearing August 26, 1993, the Honorable 
David S. Young presiding. Petitioner was present and was 
represented by Craig S. Cook. Respondents were represented by 
Angela F. Micklos and J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Assistant Attorneys 
General. Witnesses from out of town and out of State being 
present, the Court proceeded to hear the merits of the petition and 
reserved ruling on the State's motion to dismiss on procedural 
grounds. After hearing testimony, receiving evidence, and 
considering counsels1 arguments, the Court enters the following: 
NOV 22 1993 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On November 14, 1988, petitioner pled guilty to first 
degree murder, a capital offense. The trial court sentenced 
petitioner to life imprisonment. 
2. The trial court recommended that petitioner spend at 
least 20 years in prison prior to being considered for parole. 
3. During his criminal proceedings, petitioner was 
represented by James Shumate. 
4. Mr. Shumate did not object to the trial court's 20-year 
recommendation. 
5. Mr. Shumate did not request a presentence investigation 
report. 
6. Based on all available information, Mr. Shumate 
reasonably believed that a presentence report would detail 
petitioner's prior crimes, and on balance, would be a negative 
factor in the sentencing decision. 
7. Petitioner presented no evidence that the presentence 
report would have contained mitigating information. 
8. Mr. Shumate did not call mitigating witnesses at 
petitioner's sentencing hearing. 
9. Petitioner presented no evidence of what testimony any 
mitigating witnesses would have given, had they been called at the 
sentencing hearing. 
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10. At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Shumate did not make a 
statement on petitioner's behalf, having previously argued all 
mitigating factors to the Court in chambers during a plea 
conference. 
11. Petitioner made a statement on his own behalf, prior to 
being sentenced. 
12. Prior to being sentenced, petitioner knew that he faced 
a maximum of life imprisonment. 
13. By entering a guilty plea, petitioner avoided the death 
penalty, which was his primary objective in pleading guilty. 
14. A condition of the plea bargain was that petitioner would 
have been able to withdraw his plea if the trial court had imposed 
the death penalty. 
15. Mr. Shumate correctly advised petitioner that the Court 
would almost certainly impose a sentence up to and including life 
imprisonment. 
16. Mr. Shumate opined to petitioner that he might spend five 
to seven years in prison. 
17. Mr. Shumate correctly advised petitioner that the length 
of time he would actually serve in prison was under the exclusive 
control of the Board of Pardons, which would be greatly influenced 
by petitioner's conduct while in prison. 
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18. The trial judge's 20-year recommendation is not a major 
factor relied on by the Board of Pardons in setting parole 
rehearing dates. Such recommendations are accorded greater or 
lesser weight depending upon their factual support. The judge's 
recommendation here was based solely on the facts of the crime 
itself. 
19. Defendants who have pled guilty to the capital offense of 
first degree murder ordinarily receive 20 to 25 year rehearing 
dates from the Board of Pardons. 
20. On November 12, 1991
 f petitioner went before the Utah 
Board of Pardons for an original parole grant hearing. Petitioner 
was given a rehearing date of October, 2008. 
21. The Board of Pardons stated in writing its reasons for 
setting a 20-year rehearing date. The reasons included 
petitioner's prison misconduct, but did not include the judge's 
recommendation. 
22. Petitioner has the right to petition the Board of Pardons 
for an earlier rehearing date. 
23. The State's case against petitioner was strong, based 
upon eyewitness testimony and the testimony of petitioner's 
companion, Timothy Miller. 
24. Mr. Shumate testified that petitioner confessed to him 
that his purpose in approaching the victim was to obtain money, by 
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violent means if necessary, and that he shot the victim without 
provocation. 
25. Had petitioner known that the judge was going to 
recommend 20 years incarceration, petitioner might still have pled 
guilty. 
26. Petitioner never testified that but for his counsel's 
alleged deficiencies, petitioner would not have pled guilty but 
would have insisted upon going to trial. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, both that Mr. Shumate's performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, and that petitioner was 
prejudiced by any unreasonable representation. See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
2. In order to meet the prejudice prong, petitioner must 
demonstrate that but for Mr. Shumate's errors, there is a 
reasonable probability that he would have received a more favorable 
sentence and rehearing date. With respect to petitioner's claim 
that his plea was involuntary due to Mr. Shumate's ineffectiveness, 
petitioner must demonstrate that but for Mr. Shumate's error, 
petitioner would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 
upon going to trial. See Strickland, supra; Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
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U.S. 52 (1985). 
3. Mr. Shumate's representation was more than adequate; it 
did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
4. Even if Mr. Shumate committed error, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate prejudice. 
5. Petitioner was well aware when he pled guilty that he 
faced a life sentence. 
6. The trial court had only three sentencing options: 
probation, life imprisonment, and the death penalty. 
7. Petitioner has failed to show that he would have received 
a lesser sentence if Mr. Shumate had requested a presentence 
investigation report, called mitigating witnesses, or made a 
statement on petitioner's behalf at sentencing. 
8. The Board of Pardons is not bound by the trial court's 
20-year recommendation. There is no support for petitioner's claim 
that, had Mr. Shumate objected to the 20-year recommendation, 
petitioner would have received a lesser sentence and/or an earlier 
rehearing date. 
ORDER 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, and good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED as follows: The petition for habeas corpus or post-
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PER CURIAM: 
Most, if not all of the issues, Smith raises in his present 
appeal were resolved in 1993 when the Third District Court in 
Smith v. Galetka. Case No. 930900217, denied Smith's petition for 
writ of habeas corpus, which Smith did not appeal. 
Even if we address the merits of whether the trial court's 
20 year recommendation was appropriate, Smith1s argument fails. 
According to Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-13(5) (a) (1994), w[i]n all 
cases where an indeterminate sentence is imposed, the judge 
imposing the sentence shall within 30 days from the date of the 
sentence, mail to the chief executive of the board [of pardons] a 
statement in writing setting out the term for which, in his 
opinion, the offender sentenced should be imprisoned . . ." 
Since Smith's life sentence is indeterminate,1 the trial judge 
was required to make the recommendation to which Smith now 
1. According to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-4 (1994)# Ml) Whenever a 
person is convicted of a crime and the judgment provides for a 
commitment to the state prison, the court shall not fix a 
definite term of imprisonment unless otherwise provided by law. 
(2) The sentence and judgment of imprisonment shall be for an 
indeterminate term of not less than the minimum and not to exceed 
the maximum term provided by law for the particular crime." 
objects. And, even though the trial court is required to make a 
recommendation, the Board of Pardons is not bound by it and has 
discretion to determine the length of sentence it deems 
appropriate. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5 (Supp. 1996); Rawlinas 
v. Holden. 869 P.2d 958, 960-61 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), 
Smith also argues that section 77-27-13 (5) (a), requiring the 
trial court to give its opinion regarding the length of time a 
sentenced offender should be imprisoned, is unconstitutional. 
However, we reject this claim because Smith makes it for the 
first time on appeal and has failed to prove extraordinary 
circumstances or that the trial court committed plain error. 
State v, Archamceau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah ct. App. 1991) . 
dingly, the trial court is affirmed. 
Michael J. Wilkins, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Noirman H. Jacksojj^ Judge 
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